Reason for Outage (RFO)



Summary

Report details	
Date RFO	17-11-2025
Eurofiber Case number	00415953 (A+B)
Reference number customer	*Not applicable*

Details incident A	
Affected Eurofiber services	Eurofiber Internet and Ethernet
Type of incident	Priority 1 Outage: multiple services unavailable
Start date incident	17-11-2025
Start time incident	08:44 hrs
End date incident	17-11-2025
End time incident	09:51 hrs
Mean Time to Repair	01 hours and 07 minutes
Details incident B	
Impacted Eurofiber services	Eurofiber Internet & Ethernet
Type of incident	Priority 1
Start date incident	18-11-2025
Start time incident	00:07 hrs
End date incident	18-11-2025
End time incident	00:57 hrs
Mean Time to Repair	00 hours and 50 minutes

Cause of incident
Blackholing of customer traffic in Amsterdam, caused by hardware functionality failure that was triggered by power outage in third party datacenter in Amsterdam.

Solution to incident

Incident 00415953 A morning: Rerouting impacted traffic;

Incident 00415953 B night: Rerouting impacted traffic.

Comments

There were two related outages within 17 hours:

- Outage A was the initial incident.
- Outage B occurred when efforts to restore the pre-incident state triggered a second outage.

Timeline of outage

Course of incident		
Date	*Time(CET)*	*Event description*
17-11-2025	08:44:45 hrs	Start of Incident A. The Eurofiber Network Monitoring Center (NMC) receives multiple power-related alarms from equipment, located in a data center in Amsterdam.
		Power alarms clear after approximately 1 minute.
	08:45 hrs	The core distribution router, one of several within the Eurofiber network, has returned to an alarm-free power status. At no point was the full chassis of the node without power, as redundant power feeds ensured continuity. The initially reported power alarms did not impact all four feeds.
		An immediate network inspection and validation following the power outage show multiple issues within the network, escalating to 2nd & 3rd Line network specialists. At the same time, Priority 1 cases are logged with both the supplier and the manufacturer of the core network equipment.
		At the same time customers start reporting outages on their services.
		The core distribution router has 3 control boards. All 3 show unexpected behavior.
		It is concluded that the node is actually blackholing traffic, even though the node is up and running and all protocols show up.
		It is decided to reroute traffic through the Eurofiber core network in order to avoid traffic from passing the faulty device.
	09:51 hrs	Rerouting traffic is successful, services are back up and running. End of Incident A.
		Remote troubleshoot with supplier continues.
		Supplier dispatches engineer to go on site.
	11:00 hrs - 13:13 hrs	Three cards (control boards) are being reseated.

		All offline routing engines are back online as a result of the reseats; fabric degradation has disappeared. Field tech of supplier confirms the green lights on site.
		It has been decided to roll back the rerouting of traffic from incident A in an upcoming nightly window; process to start after upcoming midnight.
	00:00 hrs	Technicians all check in.
	00:07 hrs	Start works. The goal is to reinstate the initial setup.
		During the morning event, Routing Engine failed over from 0 to RE1. This failover is now being reversed in order to go back to the initial setup. Unexpectedly, the node attracts traffic again even though being in overload-state. This causes traffic to be blackholed again. This marks the beginning of outage B.
		Efforts to immediately resolve the issue to the correct source are not successful. As a result, traffic has to be rerouted again in order to restore customers services.
	00:57 hrs	Rerouting of traffic is successful, all services are up and running. End of incident B.

Lessons learned/ Follow-up

Preventive measures/follow-up investigation

With regard to outage 00415953-A, we can conclude that—although our core node never went fully down—key functionality was impacted by a power outage at the data center. The data center confirmed that a human error during their maintenance activities caused one power feed to go down, without a generator to take over.

Nevertheless, this should never have impacted Eurofiber services, as the feeds are designed to be redundant. The reason the cards containing the control boards, were impacted is that the wiring from the feeds to the power supplies and power zones was not fully in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations. This was corrected on 19th November 2025 at 21:00 hrs without any further impact. After the adjustment, failover tests—including a simulation of the Incident A situation—were performed successfully. As a result of this action, a recurrence of the impact caused by the power incident of 17th November 2025 is not likely to occur again.

With regard to incident B: Eurofiber technicians as well as its supplier of the equipment agreed that key settings regarding routing, caused routing issues in the network after the failover from routing engine 1 to 0. These settings have been adjusted and tested 19th November 2025. Eurofiber will make the core distribution router part of the traffic handling again 20th November 2025.

All applicable systems are now working properly in the live environment and are also being closely monitored by Eurofiber and suppliers. Following the incidents described above, Eurofiber has extended the recurring audit plan on all Eurofiber core nodes.